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Introduction: Scientism 
Can a pilgrimage be meaningful in a scientific age? It 
would appear not. Advocates of ‘scientism’ argue that 
science is the only source of reliable knowledge, and 
this rules out belief in miracles, the effectiveness of 
prayer, and the need for God in explanations about the 
world (Rosenberg, 2011). Traditionally, pilgrimages 
are motivated by, and explained in terms of, these very 
ideas. Pilgrimage is understood as a journey to a sacred 
place, or an attempt to connect with the miraculous. 
Thus, at first glance, the idea of pilgrimage seems 
inconsistent with a modern, scientific world-view. 
Science and Religion Might not Conflict 
After all: The N.O.M.A. Thesis 
Attempts have been made to reconcile the apparent 
conflict between science and religion. S.J. Gould 
defends a compatibility thesis on this issue which he 
calls the N.O.M.A. thesis, an acronym for Non-
Overlapping Magisteria (Gould, 1999). He argues that 
science and religion are non-overlapping languages 
that cannot conflict because they are about different 
things. Instead of conflict, urges Gould, we should seek 
separation and ‘respectful noninterference’ (Gould, 
1999:5). Science and religion are completely different 
spheres of inquiry that do different jobs and use 
different languages. The province of one sphere of 
inquiry includes science, objectivity, and empirical 
facts. All questions of meaning, value, religion, 
subjectivity, poetry and awe lie in another sphere. 
These two spheres of meaning do not conflict with 
each other anymore than a physio-chemical description 
of the paint in Monet’s Sunrise conflicts with an 
aesthetic evaluation of its beauty; nor with an 
understanding of its historical role in the Impressionist 
movement. This philosophical move makes room for 
legitimate forms of knowledge alternative to scientific 
knowledge, including such things as the language of 
sacredness, poetry and the sublime, traditional folk 
knowledge, and morality. 
N.O.M.A. a failure? 
The N.O.M.A. thesis that religion and science use very 
different languages can backfire as it might actually 
provide grounds for criticism of the religious sphere. 
Scientific belief is grounded in evidence, and is thus 
open to change with changing evidence. Religion, on 
the other hand, is grounded in faith, and prides itself in 
believing without evidence. Many believe that there is 
something fundamentally mistaken about believing 
without evidence. Richard Dawkins, for example, 
writes that ‘a case can be made that faith is one of the 
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The paper is a philosophical argument about whether a pilgrimage can be meaningful in 
a scientific age. Since a scientific world-view rules out many ideas which are 
traditionally associated with pilgrimage, such as miracles and the effectiveness of 
prayer, it seems that pilgrimage might be a practice inconsistent with the modern 
scientific age. Attempts have been made to reconcile this conflict by arguing that 
science and religion do not conflict, but are non-overlapping spheres of inquiry. Thus, it 
is possible to make sense of pilgrimage in a scientific age, if one strips their pilgrimage 
of all aspects to which science might object. However, this move makes it possible for 
almost any activity to be interpreted as a pilgrimage activity, including many activities 
usually associated with consumption, tourism, materialism, consumerism, and 
entertainment. Using ideas developed by the philosopher William James, and others, one 
can argue that many of these apparently secular activities can indeed be seen as religious 
experiences. By identifying what all religious experiences have in common, one can 
interpret many different kinds of experiences as lying on a continuum with traditional 
pilgrimage experiences.  
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Thus, one can admit that this conflict has arisen in the 
past, but if one is careful to leave scientific and 
religious questions to their own domains, one could 
still embrace the N.O.M.A. thesis. 
This leaves the project of making religion compatible 
with science by stripping it of all beliefs that scientific 
thinking would reject. So, for example, it would have 
to allow for evolution by natural selection, and a 
materialist view of the minds. Unfortunately, the end 
product is all but unrecognizable as religion in the first 
place, because such a religious belief system would not 
include a caring God, a God that created the universe, 
nor the existence of a soul that survives bodily death. 
This is the depersonalized, non-anthropomorphic God 
which Einstein likened to the philosophy of Spinoza, 
Schopenhauer and Buddhism. God is ‘the grandeur of 
reason incarnate in existence’ itself (Einstein, 
1954:49). 
Pilgrimage 
When applying these ideas to the case of pilgrimage, it 
involves removing all conflicts with scientific thinking. 
One might, for example, emphasize the psychological 
transformation made possible by the journey of 
pilgrimage itself, rather than the sacred nature of the 
journey’s end or the supposedly miraculous facts 
associated with these destinations. 
However, this understanding of pilgrimage opens the 
door which permits almost any activity to be 
interpreted as pilgrimage. Phil Cousineau, for example, 
is representative of this understanding of secular 
pilgrimage. In his inspiring book The Art of 
Pilgrimage, he instructs his readers that ‘it is possible 
to transform even the most ordinary trip into a sacred 
journey, a pilgrimage’ (Cousineau, 1998:xxv). Many 
examples are provided, including a visit to the Baseball 
Hall of Fame, paying one’s respects at an author’s 
gravesite, running with the bulls in Pamplona 
(Cousineau, 1998:xiii), as well as Hollywood inspired 
journeys to visit the home where they filmed Mrs. 
Doubtfire, or locations of The Bridges of Madison 
County (Cousineau, 1998:122-123). 
While these secular journeys certainly would not raise 
any scientific eyebrows, one wonders whether 
Cousineau is equivocating on the word ‘pilgrimage.’ 
He defines it as ‘following in the footsteps of 
somebody or something we honor to pay 
homage’ (Cousineau,1998:xv). This definition can 
easily include all his secular examples such as visiting 
the Hewlett Packard garage where the computer 
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world’s great evils’ akin to a brain virus with 
dangerous consequences (Dawkins, 2000:318). In his 
international best-seller The God Delusion, Dawkins 
provocatively claims that a belief in God is not better 
than belief in other fairy tales like Santa Claus and the 
tooth fairy (Dawkins, 2006). 
Even if one side-steps this issue, there is a more 
obvious failing in the attempt to have it both ways.  
The problem is that science and religion don’t actually 
stay out of each other’s territories. Steven Pinker and 
Richard Dawkins, for example, both point out that 
religion and science actually overlap quite a bit 
(Dawkins, 2000). ‘Unfortunately,’ writes Pinker, ‘this 
entente unravels as soon as you begin to examine 
it’ (Pinker, 2013:5). Various cultural and religious 
explanations for the origin of life, and the beginning of 
the universe, directly contradict known scientific facts. 
Religion does offer hypotheses about the nature of the 
universe, and it includes heaven, souls and the afterlife 
- things which no scientist could accept. 
Similarly, science sometimes attempts to do the work 
often attributed to the religious sphere. Feelings of 
wonder and beauty, on Gould’s N.O.M.A. hypothesis, 
are supposedly reserved for the religious sphere. 
Dawkins disagrees because ‘it’s exactly this feeling of 
spine-shivering, breath-catching awe - almost worship 
- this flooding of the chest with ecstatic wonder, that 
modern science can provide. And it does so beyond the 
wildest dreams of saints and mystics’ (Dawkins, 
2000:319). 
The hope that one could be both a scientist and a 
religious believer seems doomed to failure. It is clear 
that science and religion can overlap, and that much of 
what religion says is inconsistent with science. It is not 
the case that science and religion do different jobs. 
Religions have famously invaded scientific territory 
with pronouncements about the origin of life, the age 
of the universe, and the structure of our solar system. 
All of these beliefs turned out to be false. Religions 
postulate the existence of heaven, souls, and 
reincarnation - which are all empirically vacuous 
claims. Religion does do science, notes Dawkins, it just 
does it very badly (Dawkins, 2000:319). 
Anticipating this objection a century ago, William 
James offers a hopeful response. He writes that  
It does not follow, because our ancestors made 
so many errors of fact and mixed them with 
their religion, that we should therefore leave off 
being religious at all (James, 1958:413).  
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Wittgenstein, he defines a religious experience as a 
feeling of absolute safety and a sense belonging 
(Rosemont, 2001:31). This experience could be 
grounded in the transcendental, but need not be. One 
could feel a sense of belonging with nature, or 
humanity, or a pilgrim’s sense of belonging to all those 
who came this way before, and in whose footsteps one 
is walking. 
Interestingly, Cousineau describes pilgrimage in just 
these terms. He writes that ‘The journeys all begin in a 
restive state, in deep disturbance. Something vital was 
missing in life’ (Couineau, 1998:14-15). Pilgrims are 
dissatisfied with something in their lives, and aim to 
transform themselves, or recover something of 
themselves that they have lost. The ‘solution’ to this 
unease, James mentions, is to be found in the union of 
visible and spiritual worlds and can be achieved by 
‘prayer or inner communion’ (James, 1958:401). 
However, many experiences, other than the familiar 
religious ones of meditation and prayer, can also be 
described as a connection with a reality that lies behind 
the appearances. 
The attempt to experience the reality that lies behind 
the world of appearances has a long philosophical 
history dating back to ancient Greece. Plato, for 
example, explained that experiences derived from the 
senses are but mere illusions (Plato, 1974). The real 
world, he explains, lies in the non-sensory realm of 
ideas and numbers. Anything we perceive is only a 
representation of the real world, not the actual thing. 
17th century English empiricist John Locke explained 
how one’s experiences of colour, or shape are 
‘secondary qualities’ that do not represent the world as 
it truly is (Locke, 1996). For example, one’s 
experience of the colour red exists in one’s mind, not 
in the perceived object. The object only looks red, 
under certain lighting conditions, to human eyes. 
Change the lighting conditions and the colour will 
change. Bring in other species, like dogs and pigeons, 
and they will perceive something else altogether, since 
the rods and cones of their eyes are structured 
differently. The 18th century German philosopher 
Immanuel Kant developed a theory of ‘transcendental 
idealism’ where he too divided the world into 
appearance and reality (Kant, 1987). The ‘phenomenal 
world’ is an appearance constructed from sensations, 
and conceptual filters such as time, space, cause and 
effect. The real world, the ‘noumenal’ world, cannot be 
experienced or understood or characterized in any way, 
except to say that it exists.  
business started. His main thesis, however, still retains 
the traditional religious understanding of pilgrimage. 
His understanding of pilgrimage echoes its traditional 
meaning as a ‘transformative’ journey (Cousineau, 
1998:xiii), with an ‘aim to improve yourself by 
enduring and overcoming difficulties’ (Cousineau, 
1998:xxix). The transformation sought is described as a 
more attentive way of seeing (Cousineau, 1998:xxiii), 
and is achieved by using ‘many of the same techniques 
that traditional pilgrims use, such as contemplating 
intention and practicing deep attention’ (Cousineau, 
1998:xiii). This language further slides towards the 
religious in his liberal use of words such as ‘sacred 
places’ (Cousineau, 1998:xiii, xxiv, xxv), 
‘reverential’ (xv), ‘spiritual exercise’ (xxv), 
‘soul’ (xxv), ‘divine energy’ (xxvi), and 
‘transcendence’ (34). One can see how difficult it 
actually is to avoid the overlap between science and 
religion. 
William James rescues the N.O.M.A. thesis 
It might be tempting to reject Cousineau’s examples of 
pilgrimage as non-religious. After all, pilgrimage is 
supposed to be unlike tourism, consumption, 
materialism, consumerism, entertainment, and baseball. 
However, it will be argued that all these examples of 
pilgrimage are on a continuum rather than examples of 
different kinds of religious experiences.  
In 1901, the philosopher William James argued that 
there is ‘a common body of doctrine’ to be found in all 
religions ‘to which physical science need not 
object’ (James, 1958:420). James famously surveys 
many different ‘varieties of religious experience’ and 
notes in his book of the same name, that they all have a 
few features in common. After describing various 
religious experiences such as Buddhism, mysticism, 
the ‘healthy-minded’ religious experience -
characterised by optimism and happiness, and the ‘sick
-minded’ religious experience - characterised by 
solemnness and an emphasis on sacrifice, sin, and 
suffering, he concludes that they all share two features. 
First, all share a sense of ‘uneasiness’ that ‘there is 
something wrong about us’; and second, the ‘solution’ 
of this uneasiness whereby one is ‘saved from the 
wrongness’ by connecting with non-materialist ‘higher 
powers’ (James, 1958:418). 
Henry Rosemont Jr. argues much the same idea over a 
hundred years later in his own survey of world 
religions (Rosemont, 2001). He writes that all religions 
operate by a process of ‘ego-reduction’ (Rosemont, 
2001:21, 25, 28). Following the philosopher Ludwig 
  
The experience of historical time is also a way of 
connecting to something beyond the individual ego. A 
pilgrim gets the sense of all of those that walked that 
way over centuries. A visit to Pompeii, the Grand 
Canyon, or an archeological dig can provide the same 
frisson. A scuba-diver enters an unfamiliar realm, and 
the disorientation expands the mind in ways beyond 
the limited nature of ordinary experience. In short, 
Cousineau is correct in describing his pilgrimage 
experiences as ways of ‘confirmation that mystery 
exists in the modern world’ (Cousineau, 1998:18). 
In finding a common core for all religious experiences, 
James is voicing an early version of Gould’s N.O.M.A. 
thesis, described above. There are two aspects of 
experience, James reminds us, the subjective and the 
objective. Religious experiences, James observes, 
always act at the ‘private’ and ‘personal’ level, 
whereas science operates at the ‘cosmic’ and 
‘universal’ level (James, 1958:411). For example, 
religious experiences of ‘the rainbow,’ ‘summer rain,’ 
and ‘the stars’ are not ‘about the physical laws which 
these things follow,’ but about inner, subjective 
experience (James, 1958:411). 
Pilgrimage is not just about a physical place, but is also 
experienced at a subjective level. One’s visit to 
Lourdes need not be insincere if one does not believe 
in the literal, objective truth of the miracles which are 
supposed to have occurred there. The pilgrimage can 
have significance at personal, subjective, metaphorical, 
and symbolic levels. So too, can a visit to the place 
where Judy Garland died have personal meaning for 
someone, whereas for most others it is just a place and 
not a meaningful experience. 
Philosopher Mary Midgely has recently argued, along 
similar lines, for the compatibility of science and 
religion (Midgely, 2014). She writes that neither 
science nor religion is illusory. Rather, they talk about 
the same topic from different angles and ask different 
questions (Midgely, 2014:27-28). In ‘Are you an 
Illusion?’ she emphasizes the primacy of her 
experience of such things that scientism denies, such as 
free will, consciousness, intentional purpose, Self, 
soul, and meaning. For example, the existence of 
‘gratitude’ seems to be a brute fact of experience for 
her, and it does not make sense, she thinks, unless 
there is someone to be grateful to. Her main target is 
the rejection, by science, of the experience of an inner 
Self as a mere illusion. Since scientism cannot make 
sense of these obvious experiences, she argues, then it 
is scientism that must be rejected. The scope of science 
is limited, as it excludes subjectivity, and thus, it 
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While Kant and Locke believed that the real world 
behind the appearance could not be experienced, others 
have argued that it can be, at least momentarily, under 
special circumstances. ‘Sublime’ experiences, for 
example, are vehicles for transcendence. Sublime 
experiences are those where one feels awe and terror at 
the same time, and this lifts one’s consciousness out of 
an individual ego to connect with something beyond 
the self. Contemplation of the stars and the infinite 
distances involved is a sublime experience. Albert 
Schweitzer describes his sublime experience of 
paddling a dugout canoe, at sunset, down an African 
river through a herd of hippos (Schweitzer, 1998). He 
suddenly felt connected with all life, as his individual 
ego dissolved, and he developed this into an ethical 
theory known as ‘reverence for life.’ The New England 
Transcendentalist Henry David Thoreau found spiritual 
transcendence through extreme walking every day for 
four hours, in all kinds of weather (Smith, 199:9). The 
17th century German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer 
argued that music was a way to eliminate the 
distinction between the subjective observer and the 
objective thing being observed, and thus connect with a 
more fundamental aspect of existence (Magee, 
1983:167-169). Aldous Huxley poetically describes 
how psychedelic drug experiences can be interpreted as 
religious experiences of altered states of consciousness 
(Huxley, 2009). Frederick Franck explains how the 
experience of drawing and sketching is an act of 
meditation that connects us to the ‘awesome mystery 
and miracle we share’ (Franck, 1993:xvii). All these 
experiences share the two features that William James 
claims are common to all religious experiences; 
namely, an uneasiness, and its solution. 
As one can imagine, these examples could be 
multiplied and easily applied to the non-traditional 
pilgrimage experiences of the sort Cousineau 
describes, and were listed above. In the presence of 
great architecture, one can often be swept up in 
contemplation of the elemental forces involved in 
supporting enormous domes, and engineering that 
allows for natural lighting (Mann, 1993). This type of 
architecture reveals fundamental truths of the universe, 
and reminds one of William Blake’s poem where he 
suggests that the understanding of the universe is 
available in each grain of sand:  
To see a World in a Grain of Sand 
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower 
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand 
And Eternity in an hour (Blake, 1950). 
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Conclusion 
While science seems to conflict with religious 
language, and seems to render the concept of 
pilgrimage meaningless, the N.O.M.A. thesis that 
science and religion are non-overlapping sphere of 
inquiry has been defended from many different angles 
over the last century. The price of this accommodation 
is to broaden the concept of pilgrimage to include 
experiences in popular culture that have not 
traditionally been associated with religious experience. 
However, one can interpret all these experiences as 
lying on a continuum with traditional pilgrimage 
experiences. They all and all seek to connect with a 
larger reality yet describe the experiences at a personal 
level of meaning. They all bring a sense of belonging. 
Thus, there is no clear distinction to be made between 
religious and secular pilgrimages. 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank Peter Matthews, at the University 
of the Arts, London, for his friendly conversations that 
helped me organize my thoughts on this topic.  
Bibliography 
Bakewell, S. (2016) The Existentialist Café. Toronto: Alfred 
A. Knopf Canada. 
Blake, W. (1950) ‘Auguries of Innocence’ in Poets of the 
English Language. New York: Viking Press. 
Cousineau, P. (1998) The Art of Pilgrimage. San Francisco: 
Conari Press. 
Dawkins, R. (2000) ‘Is Science a Religion?’ in Readings in 
the Philosophy of Science: from positivism to 
postmodernism. Theodore Schick Jr. (ed.). Mountain 
View, CA: Mayfield Publishers, 318-322. 
Dawkins, R. (2006) The God Delusion. New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
Einstein, A. (1954) Ideas and Opinions. New York: Crown 
Publishers, 41-9. 
Franck, F. (1993) Zen Seeing, Zen Drawing: Meditation in 
Action. New York: Bantam Books. 
Gould, S.J. (1999) Rock of Ages: Science and Religion in the 
Fullness of Life. New York: Ballantine Books. 
Huxley, A. (2009) The Doors of Perception. New York: 
Harper Perennial Modern Classics. 
James, W. (1958/1901) The Varieties of Religious 
Experience. Toronto: Penguin Books (Mentor). 
cannot answer all questions. To understand the world, 
and solve problems in it, we need more than just 
science. We will also need politics, economics, history, 
poetry, philosophy and many other methods of inquiry. 
Science is only one of many disciplines.  
Roger Scruton also rejects scientism because science 
cannot explain essential aspects of existence such as 
love, beauty, art, the sacred, interpersonal relationships 
and the transcendent dimension of human experience 
(Scruton, 2014). The thesis of scientism is that because 
science cannot explain these things, or else explains 
them away, then they must be dismissed as illusions. 
The response being made here, by both Scruton and 
Midgely, is to reverse the burden of proof. Some 
concepts and experiences are fundamental and 
necessary to our understanding the world. Because 
science cannot explain these things, then the claims of 
scientism to have eliminated them are false. 
An experience, argues Scruton, can be meaningful 
even if we cannot explain it with words and logic 
(Scruton, 2014). As examples, he refers to viewing 
great works of art, or watching the sunset. This kind of 
experience is real and meaningful—despite the fact 
that it cannot be explained in terms of empirical 
evidence, nor proved by the scientific method. These 
‘moments of revelation’ reveal the paucity of scientism 
since it cannot include them in its explanations. 
The phenomenologist, Husserl, also wrote insightfully 
about the non-overlapping languages of objective 
science and personal experience. Phenomenologists 
insist that one can talk meaningfully of experiences, 
such as freedom, and Self, without answering questions 
of truth or epistemology. In summarizing the history of 
the movement, Sarah Bakewell writes that 
‘Phenomenology is useful for talking about religious or 
mystical experiences: we can describe them as they 
feel from the inside without having to prove that they 
represent the world accurately’ (Bakewell, 2016:42). 
Bakewell provides further examples to illustrate this 
key point. The meaning and importance of music, for 
example, is best described in terms of the personal 
experience of feelings and emotions, rather than as 
compressed sound waves and frequencies. Similarly, 
the experience of an illness cannot be equated with 
purely physical descriptions of bodily processes 
(Bakewell, 2016:42). 
  
Plato (1974) Plato’s Republic. Indianapolis, Indiana: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.. 
Rosement, H. Jr. (2001) Rationality and Religious 
Experience. Peru, Illinois: Carus Publishing Company. 
Rosenberg, A. (2011) The Atheist’s Guide to Reality. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company. 
Smith, D.C. (1997) The Transcendental Saunterer: Thoreau 
and the Search for Self. Savannah: Frederic C. Beil. 
Scruton, R. (2014) The Soul of the World. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Schweitzer, A. (1998) Out of My Life and Thought: An 
Autobiography. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins 
University Press. 
Haller The Possibility of Pilgrimage in a Scientific World  
  
  
~ 31 ~ 
Kant, I. (1987) The Critique of Pure Reason. W.S. Pluhar 
(translation). Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc.. 
Locke, J. (1996) An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. K.P. Winkler (ed). Indianapolis, Indiana: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.. 
Magee, B. (1983) The Philosophy of Schopenhauer. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Mann, A.T. (1993) Sacred Architecture. Shaftesbury, 
Dorset: Element Books Ltd.. 
Midgely, M. (2014) Are you an Illusion? NewYork: 
Routledge. 
Pinker, S. (2013) ‘Science Is Not Your Enemy.’ New 
Republic, Aug 6. 
